Intellectual Property Rightsversus Tax Incentives

This study addresses the alternate problems associated with intellectual property: freeriding and monopoly. With respect to the
“anticommons” problems associated with monopoly rights it examines the proposal of Boldrin and Levine (2008, 2015) for the extinguishment of all such intellectual property rights. In this study, a theoretical model of intellectual property production has
been presented as a framework for discussion, in which the specific claims of Boldrin and Levine are considered, a long with a proposal for the extinguishment of intellectual property rights accompanied by a self-funded system of value added taxes and intellectual property tax credits. Finally, it identifies the conditions under which such a system could encourage the production of intellectual property as well as the conditions under which no such tax incentives are required.

References

i. Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons.
ii. Bessen, J., & Meurer, M. J. (2009). Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton University Press.
iii. Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2008). Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge University Press.
iv. Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2015). Intellectual Property. Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
v. Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics.
vi. Cockburn, I., Kortum, S., & Stern, S. (2003). Are All Patent Examiners Created Equal? In Intellectual Property in the Knowledge-Based Economy, National Academy of Sciences.
vii. David, P. (2003). Can “Open Science” be Protected from the Evolving Regime of Intellectual Property Protections? Stanford Working Paper #03-011.
viii. David, P. (2001a). From Keeping “Nature’s Secrets” to the Institutionalization of “Open Science.” Stanford Working Paper #01-006.
ix. David, P. (2001b). Will Building Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors in Science? Stanford Working Paper #01-005.
x. David, P. (2000). The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science.” Stanford Working Paper #00-016.
xi. Deloitte (2014). Global Survey of R & D Tax Incentives.
xii. Depoorter, B., & Vanneste, S. (2006). Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation. Oregon Law Review.
xiii. Fogelberg, L., & Griffith, J. Financing Strategies of the R & D Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Business.
xiv. Fogelberg, L., & Krishnamoorthy, A. (2014). The Market for Tomatoes: Market Breakdown in a High Technology Economy. Delhi Business Review.
xv. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press.
xvi. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press.
xvii. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
xviii. Heller, M. (1998). The Tragedy of the Anticommons. Harvard Law Review, 111, 621.
xix. Heller, M., & Eisenberg, R. (1998). Can patents deter innovation? Science, 280.
xx. Lessig, L. (2002). The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. Random House.
xxi. Merges, R., Mennell, P. S., & Lemley, M. (2003). Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age. Aspen Publishers.
xxii. Merges, R., & Nelson, R. R. (1990). On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope. Columbia Law Review, 90.
xxiii. Merges, R. P., & Nelson, R. R. (1994). On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25(1), 1–24.
xxiv. Moser, P. (2005). How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? American Economic Review, 95, 1214–1236.
xxv. Murray, F., & Stern, S. (2007). Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 63(4), 648–687.
xxvi. Nuvolari, A. (2004). Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28, 347–363.
xxvii. Thomson, J. A., et al. (1998). Science, 282, 1145–1147.
xxviii. Thurow, L. C. (1997). Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights. Harvard Business Review.
xxix. Ely, J., & Valimaki, J. (2003). Bad reputation. NAJ Econ.
xxx. Fudenberg, D., & Kreps, D. (1987). Reputation in simultaneous play. Review of Economic Studies, 54, 541–568.
xxxi. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1994). Efficiency and observability. Journal of Economic Theory, 62, 103–135.
xxxii. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1989). Reputation and equilibrium selection. Econometrica, 57, 759–778.
xxxiii. Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., & Levine, D. K. (1994). Folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica, 62, 997–1039.
xxxiv. Mailath, G., & Samuelson, L. (2001). Who wants a good reputation. Review of Economic Studies, 68, 415–441.
xxxv. Morris, S. (2001). Political correctness. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 311–323.
xxxvi. Schmidt, K. (1993). Reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games. Econometrica, 61, 325–351.
xxxvii. Sorin, S. (1999). Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 274–308.

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Dr. Larry Fogelberg, Dr. Anand Krishbnamoorthy . (2018). Intellectual Property Rightsversus Tax Incentives. DIAS Technology Review, 15(1), 52-57.

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[1] i. Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons.

[2] ii. Bessen, J., & Meurer, M. J. (2009). Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton University Press.

[3] iii. Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2008). Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge University Press.

[4] iv. Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2015). Intellectual Property. Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.

[5] v. Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics.

[6] vi. Cockburn, I., Kortum, S., & Stern, S. (2003). Are All Patent Examiners Created Equal? In Intellectual Property in the Knowledge-Based Economy, National Academy of Sciences.

[7] vii. David, P. (2003). Can “Open Science” be Protected from the Evolving Regime of Intellectual Property Protections? Stanford Working Paper #03-011.

[8] viii. David, P. (2001a). From Keeping “Nature’s Secrets” to the Institutionalization of “Open Science.” Stanford Working Paper #01-006.

[9] ix. David, P. (2001b). Will Building Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors in Science? Stanford Working Paper #01-005.

[10] x. David, P. (2000). The Digital Technology Boomerang: New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science.” Stanford Working Paper #00-016.

[11] xi. Deloitte (2014). Global Survey of R & D Tax Incentives.

[12] xii. Depoorter, B., & Vanneste, S. (2006). Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation. Oregon Law Review.

[13] xiii. Fogelberg, L., & Griffith, J. Financing Strategies of the R & D Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Business.

[14] xiv. Fogelberg, L., & Krishnamoorthy, A. (2014). The Market for Tomatoes: Market Breakdown in a High Technology Economy. Delhi Business Review.

[15] xv. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press.

[16] xvi. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press.

[17] xvii. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.

[18] xviii. Heller, M. (1998). The Tragedy of the Anticommons. Harvard Law Review, 111, 621.

[19] xix. Heller, M., & Eisenberg, R. (1998). Can patents deter innovation? Science, 280.

[20] xx. Lessig, L. (2002). The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. Random House.

[21] xxi. Merges, R., Mennell, P. S., & Lemley, M. (2003). Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age. Aspen Publishers.

[22] xxii. Merges, R., & Nelson, R. R. (1990). On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope. Columbia Law Review, 90.

[23] xxiii. Merges, R. P., & Nelson, R. R. (1994). On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25(1), 1–24.

[24] xxiv. Moser, P. (2005). How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? American Economic Review, 95, 1214–1236.

[25] xxv. Murray, F., & Stern, S. (2007). Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 63(4), 648–687.

[26] xxvi. Nuvolari, A. (2004). Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28, 347–363.

[27] xxvii. Thomson, J. A., et al. (1998). Science, 282, 1145–1147.

[28] xxviii. Thurow, L. C. (1997). Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights. Harvard Business Review.

[29] xxix. Ely, J., & Valimaki, J. (2003). Bad reputation. NAJ Econ.

[30] xxx. Fudenberg, D., & Kreps, D. (1987). Reputation in simultaneous play. Review of Economic Studies, 54, 541–568.

[31] xxxi. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1994). Efficiency and observability. Journal of Economic Theory, 62, 103–135.

[32] xxxii. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1989). Reputation and equilibrium selection. Econometrica, 57, 759–778.

[33] xxxiii. Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., & Levine, D. K. (1994). Folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica, 62, 997–1039.

[34] xxxiv. Mailath, G., & Samuelson, L. (2001). Who wants a good reputation. Review of Economic Studies, 68, 415–441.

[35] xxxv. Morris, S. (2001). Political correctness. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 311–323.

[36] xxxvi. Schmidt, K. (1993). Reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games. Econometrica, 61, 325–351.

[37] xxxvii. Sorin, S. (1999). Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 274–308.